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Glenn A. Goodwin, associate professor of sociology, returned to Pitzer this fall after a two-year leave in Egypt and England. Among the several honors awarded Goodwin was a one-semester teaching position at Cairo National University. He is the first American to be invited to teach in an Egyptian national University. He was also visiting associate professor of sociology at the American University in Cairo where he held the position of faculty vice-chairman.


Susan B. Oberg graduated cum laude from UCLA where she was a member of Phi Beta Kappa, then went to Middlebury College, the School of French in France. She spent two years studying in Pau, Bordeaux, and Paris then wrote her master's thesis on "Les Relations Entre l'Objet et le Sujet dans les Fleurs du Mal." She describes it as a study of the device used by Baudelaire and Sylvia Plath, in which the poet becomes the object of his regard. In addition to poetry, Ms. Oberg is writing a fictional journal of Ophelia before, during, and after the action of "Hamlet."

At Pitzer she is assistant to the dean of the faculty.
Non-self-oriented behavior in a traditional society.

The rise of the "self" is recent in Western history. Concurrent with the rise has been an emphasis on the individual in economic, social, political, and spiritual matters. Not until the 17th century, for example, did self-prefixes (such as self-regard) appear in English, their introduction coinciding with the growing importance of individualistic Puritanism (Bruner, 1951). Today the ascendency of the self is taken for granted. We are unsurprised to hear a 9-year-old, beaten by an adult more than two to one in a Scrabble game, nonetheless proclaim afterward "I was brilliant," or to read that the critic Edmund Wilson would arise at 4 A.M. to read old reviews of his books (Wilson, 1971), or to learn of social science studies on self-esteem, self-perception, self-presentation, and even self-actualization.

The Western self-orientation is extreme by worldwide standards, and three major studies demonstrate it as such. In five American Southwest communities, three Western and two Indian, adult individuals were administered a carefully formulated questionnaire designed to evoke their orientations to a series of common human problems — for example, the nature of human nature, the relation of man to nature, and the relation of men to each other (Kluckholn & Strodtbeck, 1961). For the last problem, the structured responses were sortable into one of three styles of relationship to other men — individualistic, linear, or collateral. All three Western groups (Anglo Homesteaders, Mormons, and Spanish-Americans) felt individualistic relationships to be right, whereas Navaho and Zuni Indians chose collateral, or group-oriented, relations. The following is a typical problem from the relational sphere. Answer B was scored as Collateral and Answer C as Individualistic.

Help in Misfortune. A man had a crop failure, or, let us say, had lost most of his sheep or cattle. He and his family had to have help from someone if they were going to get through the winter. There are different ways of getting help. Which of these ways would be best?


Self-Orientation

Besides Shakespeare and me, who do you think there is?

Gertrude Stein
Would it be best if he depended mostly on his brothers and sisters or other relatives all to help him out as much as each one could?

Would it be best for him to try to raise the money on his own outside the community (his own people) from people who are neither relatives nor employers? [Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961, p. 83]

In the Homesteader, Mormon, and Zuni communities, third- through sixth-graders were given a series of paper-and-pencil tests, and already in this middle-childhood period there were definite signs of the emerging values (Whiting, Chasdi, Antonovsky, & Ayres, 1966). On a question about magical change in status, the Western emphasis on the self could be seen in the personal achievement responses given by Homesteaders and Mormons (48% of the two samples) as compared to Zuni (20% of the sample). In answer to a question about the worst thing that could happen to a person, Westerners showed a heightened concern over the self by their high frequency of responses like “death” or “injury” (50%) in comparison with the Zuni’s responses relating to self (31%). The modal response for the Zuni on this question involved a less radical self-concern in the form of some sort of punishment.

The second study also compared white Americans with Indian Americans, only this time a single group of Anglo school children was contrasted with seven Amerindian groups of schoolchildren (Havighurst & Neugarten, 1955). From a test of moral ideology and from one of emotional response, several variables related to the self were extracted. The Anglo children scored at the top of the scale on almost all the variables, namely, individual achievement, competence, self-restraint, and self-gratification. In the concluding description, the authors depict the Anglo society as follows: “In comparison to the simpler societies of the Southwest Indians, Midwest is a self-centered society, where the individual's responsibility and the individual's feelings are given priority over his concern about the social group” (Havighurst & Neugarten, 1955, p. 198).

The third study was part of the Six Cultures Study (B. Whiting & Whiting, 1975; Whiting & Whiting, 1973). In this case, behavioral observ-
and this would include most peoples of the world. Also, an ailing self, or psychoneurosis, may appear much more frequently where the sense of self is great — civilization and its malcontents, we might say. Similarly, the experience of depression, both as pathology and in its less severe episodic form, may be more available to the highly self-oriented individual. Depression has in fact been observed less frequently in some traditional areas than in Western or highly Christianized societies (LeVine, 1961; Wittkower, 1969), and special depressive problems like the involutional melancholia occasionally associated with menopause are virtually absent in the traditional world. Even ennui can perhaps be experienced strongly only where a sharp self-orientation exists. Another possible outcome of the treatment of the self as a discrete and important entity may be the ability to regulate one’s own behavior to a marked degree, as in long-term delay of gratification, or in the application of internal moral standards rather than socially imposed controls (such as gossip or witchcraft accusations) (Grinder & McMichael, 1963). That simpler societies may function with less self-regulation of behavior is supported by the finding that mothers in these groups impose more obedience demands and are more authoritarian in their relations with children (B. Whiting & Whiting, 1975).

On a completely different tack, religious mysticism, promoting loss of the self in the All, has regularly appeared in the great civilizations but not in traditional societies, and may represent a recurring cultural “solution” to the problems generated by high self-concern. Asceticism and masochism also appear more frequently in modern societies. LeVine has stated, for example, that “Africans usually cannot understand what moral virtue there can be in extreme forms of self-denial and self-punishment” (1973b, p. 143). Self-denial and self-injury are more probable where there is greater self-awareness.

Cognition might be affected by a strong self-orientation. Sharp differentiation of self from social environment should facilitate the context-free thought that is characteristic of modern men and would be an additional factor explaining their cognitive performance in comparison with that of traditional peoples. On this point, unfound among traditional peoples are so-called idiot savants, who can perform incredible computational feats but whose defective reasoning ability leaves them unable to comprehend ordinary conversations and makes them classifiable as mental retardates. Perhaps idiot savants develop their special skills out of an awareness of social rejection and resulting focus and pertinacity bred from their desire to gain acceptance (Fowler, 1969). The rejection could lead to a greater-than-usual concern with self, and the high self-concern might well be a necessary condition for the anomalous attainments of these individuals. The absence of idiot savants in traditional societies may reflect greater social acceptance of mental retardation and, ultimately, show evidence of less stimulation of self-concern in retardates. Along these same lines, men of genius have suffered the early death of a parent far more frequently than a chance level would predict (Albert, 1971), and, again, an experience meaningful for self-concern might be implicated as a background factor.

If the individual is sensitive to his own self, it follows that he may achieve awareness of other selves. The capacity for strong empathy — or, in psychoanalytic terms, the extension of the self — could be dependent on the prior development of a strong self and might account in part for the stress that Westerners put on love, intimacy, and emotional attachments in interpersonal relations (Leichty, 1963; LeVine, 1973b). The existence of primary caretakers who are empathic assures some perpetuation of the self-focusing system. Even a trivial matter like concern for pets is apparently distributed differentially among Westerners and at least some non-Westerners: “The reaction of Africans to the pet-keeping practices of Britons and Americans living in Africa is usually one of astonishment and amusement at the personalized con-
cern and affection for animals" (LeVine, 1973b, p. 142). The trauma of separation among intimates in the Western world, described below by LeVine, would be found in few traditional societies.

We are accustomed to making strenuous efforts to avoid separating from our most intimate loved ones, to engaging in tearful departures and reunions, and to making the assumption that separation in physical residence — as when a child leaves home — has a final quality about it like a death and must be similarly mourned until the original emotional investment is irrevocably withdrawn or attenuated. These tendencies are not only widespread in our populations but are exalted in a variety of cultural forms ranging from sentimental literature and films to humanitarian ideologies with their concern about those who are rejected and abandoned ... (1973b, p. 141).

There is, finally, still another side to this. Just as self-orientation implies the possibility of other-orientation, so empathic emotions imply the possibility not only of strong positive relations but also of strong negative relations with others. If the feelings of other selves can be understood emotionally, then great love can be generated and so, too, can great hate. Christian love is linked indissolubly with religious bigotry (Hsu, 1972): onward Christian soldiers. Wartime atrocities, political purges, exquisite torture methods, and acts of sadism are all more available to the self that can apprehend what other selves are feeling.

The United States and some other modern nations may lie at the far end of a scale of self orientation, but the Six Culture findings indicate that a similar development, if not so powerful, will take place whenever there is cultural complexity. As long as the child is not needed he will focus on himself, and as the simpler traditional patterns continue to fade in the 20th century, this development of self may soon be common everywhere.

By Ruth H. Munroe and Robert L. Munroe

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On Love as the Source of Meaning*

*This essay was written while on sabbatical leave to the University of Bath during Spring, 1974. I wish to thank Professor S. F. Cotgrove and other University staff who made library facilities and office space available to me while visiting Bath. My thanks also to BG, Frank Pearce, and Mike Brake for commenting upon various drafts of the paper. The shortcomings of the paper, as always, remain the responsibility of its author.

To ask most contemporary sociologists to participate in a discussion of the concept “love” is to invite a response that most often will pursue the neo-positivist game of insisting on operational definitions, scales, indices, and other empirically verifiable indicators. I wish to be clear from the beginning that there is little satisfaction in this essay for the positivist, for the type of thinker whom the sociologist, Peter Berger (1963: 141) refers to as an “intellectual barbarian” who “is likely to maintain that reality is only that which can be grasped by scientific methods”. Hence, should the reader find that his response to a discussion of love is similarly prescribed, he may wish to read no further. The success of the theoretical journey on which we are about to embark depends to a great extent upon the willingness of the reader to exercise his sociological imagination and to sustain a tolerance for such “unscientific” concepts as “love”, “soul”, and “being”, concepts that are indispensable for any serious consideration of the human condition. In addition, the essay rests upon a set of fundamental assumptions and while they are clearly consistent with the history and development of sociological and social psychological theory, like all assumptions they should be clearly stated.

Accordingly, my initial presupposition is that the human being is the only creature capable of loving both himself and others. Animals do not experience love. Secondly, I wish to assume a distinction between “love” and “sex”. While both “love” and “sex” may frequently occur together in interpersonal relationships, a major problem in contemporary western society is the failure of social beings to recognize and appreciate the distinction between the two experiences. This is especially apparent in capitalist, male-dominated societies that place a high social value on one’s ability to master the techniques of control and suppression of others. Thus, as Rollo May (1972: 56) points out, American men too often see themselves as “fucking machines” and place a great emphasis on sexual technique as the ultimate measure of masculinity. The experience of love, though often confused with sexual satisfaction and prowess, is qualitatively different. The clearest way to identify this difference is to note the profound depth of feeling that accompanies a love relationship, a depth of feeling that is absent in a relationship based solely on sexual gratification. As May (1972: 52) puts it, a machine can go through all the motions but it never feels. Thus, love, though it may be solidified in sexual union, has a temporal dimension associated with it that transcends sexual activity.

This temporal dimension suggests my third assumption, namely, that above all else love is a process, a state of both being and becoming that
occurs among human individuals. Such a state or process, it should be obvious, is not limited exclusively to male/female relationships. A male can "love" another male just as a female can "love" another female. Finally, and perhaps most important of all, I will assert that love is the major source of meaning for contemporary human beings. While at first blush this assertion may appear almost pedestrian in content, it will become rapidly apparent that I am not implying a continuing sense of contentment or happiness which is too frequently assumed in the Western tradition of romantic love. Rather, I will attempt to outline a social psychology which argues that anguish is as equally essential for meaning as joy and that love is the major source of both. In other words, the dialectics of meaning presuppose the polar opposites of joy-anguish and the way in which these opposites are integrated is revealed in the process of loving and being loved.

As is generally the case when one looks carefully at an aspect of the human condition, certain paradoxical features of man's existence are revealed. I have long been convinced that the human being's capacity to exist meaningfully in the midst of paradox which he himself creates is the quality that gives him his uniqueness. This essay is in continuing support of that conviction.

On love as the Source of Meaning

'Dost thou not in pride scorn
Fill with tempests all my mourn,
And with jealousies and fears
Fill my pleasant nights with tears?'

(William Blake, "Broken Love")

Any sensitive analysis of interpersonal relationships, whether they be in the tradition of humanistic social science, literature, or simply insightful speculation reveals an immense capacity for the social being to create misery and anguish for himself and others, all in the name of the search for happiness. Indeed, as I have argued in other places (Goodwin, 1971; 1973), it is the human being's capacity to create such dissonance and then to react to it that establishes his sense of meaning in the contemporary world. Love is certainly no exception to this process and indeed may well be the ultimate expression of it. The latter is particularly apparent when we realize that the dialectics of meaning assert the impossibility of "joy" or "contentment" without the existence of "anguish" or "despair". They are all there in the love relationship.

That grief and sorrow are by-products of the love relationship is a theme that is as old as literature itself. The tragedy of Romeo and Juliet or the anguish experienced between a Catherine and a Heathcliffe are as telling of the love relationship today as they were yesterday. The themes expressed through the genius of William Shakespeare and Emily Bronte continue: to love another and to be loved by another is to experience the full range of negative as well as positive human emotions. It is this quality of experience, with an emphasis on nurturing and confronting the negative, that I contend is the source of meaning.

That the sense of the tragic is essential for meaning and that it is manifested most clearly in the love relationship finds support in the work of such humanistic psychologists as Rollo May and Viktor Frankl. In a passage that indicates his appreciation for the dialectical nature of meaning and that love is "where its at", Rollo May (1972: 109-10) writes:

Far from being a negation of life and love, the tragic is an ennobling and deepening aspect of our experience of love... Love brings both joy and destruction.

Similarly, the work of the famous psychiatrist, Viktor Frankl, has long been concerned with the social being's capacity for both creating and responding to grief and sorrow and, indeed, has concluded that our uniqueness lies in our ability to experience such a confrontation meaningfully. Frankl's views on the capacity for human beings to both create and respond to grief meaningfully were initially developed by drawing upon his own experiences in a Nazi concentration camp during World War II. On the basis of these experiences Frankl (1971) has worked out the psycho-therapeutic technique he calls "logotherapy" which emphasizes the
human being's capacity for what Frankl calls a "will to meaning". In addition, Frankl (as cited in Fabry, 1969: 43) recognizes the significance of the love relationship for nurturing this confrontation, as can be seen when he contends that "... love presents man with a gift that he has otherwise to get by effort: his uniqueness". Thus, the uniqueness of the human being lies in his capacity to love and to be loved and the essence of that capacity is to personally experience what I have referred to as the dialectics of meaning.

The tragedy of Romeo and Juliet or the anguish experienced between a Catherine and a Heathcliffe are as telling of the love relationship today as they were yesterday.

Essentially, the dialectics of meaning as applied to the love relationship refers to the continuous give and take between the self and others as well as the ubiquitous creation of a new being that emerges out of such a relationship. In addition, as in classical dialectical thought, the dialectics of meaning denote the impossibility of such human conditions as "happiness" or "joy" without the antithetical conditions of "despair" and "anguish". Thus, as I will indicate below, not to confront the negative as well as the positive aspects of the human condition is not to exist meaningfully. Such a confrontation and its accompanying sense of meaning is epitomized in the love relationship. Further, it should be clear that my frame of reference for the discussion of love is based upon tapping the dynamics involved in interpersonal relationships, i.e., on examining what occurs between two selves who experience a profound depth of emotion which is grounded in each other's being. Accordingly, the love of which I write refers to a total human experience and, as I stated earlier, needs to be distinguished from such segmented experiences as "physical or sexual attraction" to another and/or "infatuation" with another.

For the reader in search of a framework to handle my contention that the love relationship, by inspiring the experience of anguish and despair is the source of meaning for contemporary human beings, I can offer the begin-

nings of a phenomenological social psychology of interpersonal relationships. What happens when an individual relinquishes his soul to another or when he captures the soul of another?1 The essence of this process lies in beginning to comprehend what happens to the self when it realizes it has "fallen in love" and that it is loved by another.

As in any social psychology2 of the self, an identity or conception of self begins to emerge and, at that moment, is subject to continuous change by the other. That such is indeed the case finds support in Max Scheler's view of the love relationship as the giving of oneself to a total being and the accompanying disclosure of the essence of that being, and in Simone Weil's contention (1968) that individuals who love each other desire to "enter into" each other in order to make one being out of both.3 It should be emphasized here that while the reference to "making one being out of both" is used in a symbolic sense, it does call attention to the creation of a powerful social bond that transcends both of the interactants involved. This emergent bond, while not a "being" sui generis, establishes the claim that each of the participants in such a relationship are incomprehen-

1 I am using "soul" here in a literary (as opposed, for example, to a metaphysical or religious) sense. Thus, the phrase "relinquishes his soul" refers to the total giving of one person's sense of being to another. The essence of this type of usage can be grasped in the recognition that the character of Romeo is utterly incomprehensible without Juliet, just as Catherine is incomprehensible without Heathcliffe. In other words, as I will point out momentarily, two individuals in a love relationship become an extension and revision of each other.

2 The emphasis on social psychology is intended by way of contrast to a psychologically behavioristic social psychology. A truly social social psychology places emphasis on analyzing the emergence of the self concept through the process of social (symbolic) interaction, while a behavioristic social psychology tends to stress what it assumes to be the determinant psychological and physiological qualities of self development. Historically, the former perspective grew out of the work of George Herbert Mead, W.I. Thomas, and Charles Horton Cooley while the latter approach is associated with the work of J.B. Watson and B.F. Skinner.

3 My thanks to Robin Marriner for making this work of Simone Weil's available to me, and for his clarification and discussion of Weil's work generally.
sible without the other. It is in this sense that Catherine becomes Heathcliffe and Romeo becomes Juliet.

To placate the reader who has a low tolerance for such metaphysics as are revealed in either Max Scheler or Simone Weil, and who is prone to denouncing them as “non social psychology”, some comfort may be taken in the fact that Charles Horton Cooley, one of the founding fathers of American social psychology, makes the identical assertion when he (1968: 91) writes: “... what we love intensely or for a long time we are likely to bring within the citadel, and to assert as part of ourself”. The principle I am calling attention to, of course, is the interactionist point of view which reveals the mutual effect that loved ones have on each other. Erich Fromm (1968: 335) calls attention to this perspective when he argues that love of oneself and love of others is parallel, as does Viktor Frankl (cited in Fabry, 1969: 79) when he suggests that “love lets us see the potentialities of the beloved person that have not yet been actualized.” The fact that two individuals in a love relationship have profound influence upon each other, particularly as regards their specific conceptions of self, is incontestable given the literature of social psychology.

What also occurs in a love relationship, and what is not always consciously appreciated, is that a particular type of power becomes the name of the game. It should be clear that I am using power in the Weberian sense of the capacity to influence the behavior of another and that I am not calling attention to the relatively conscious and manipulative process identified by Alfred Adler as the typical power struggle that goes on between individuals. Rather, although there is neither time nor space in this essay to elaborate on the specifics involved with it, I wish to call attention to the almost incredible ability that a loved one has to exercise control over the other, an exercise that is certainly not always consciously manipulative. Interestingly, some expressions of this control that, depending upon the situations involved, may or may not be consciously manipulative and which are direct by-products of a system of social values that legitimate the ownership and control of private property, are the phenomena of intense jealousy and strong feelings of personal and/or sexual possessiveness. In such a social system, loved ones may come to experience each other as “pieces of property” and attempt to “protect” their “property” from the invasion of others, resulting in the exercise of overt control over each other’s lives and, in all probability, the eventual negation of the very love they share between them. There is, however, another less obvious though equally compelling type of power and control that is exercised in a love relationship. It is the type of power that can be exerted without even uttering a word. Thus, a concerned glance, a momentary depression, or even a sigh from a loved one is frequently enough to decide an issue between them. Discussion becomes superfluous. This is the ultimate power of which I write.

In passing, I might note that particular factions of the contemporary Women’s Liberation Movement fail to understand the power a loving female has over a loving male and for these organizations to assert the unqualified “powerlessness of women” and to identify all men as their “enemies” is both naive and little

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4Cooley, via his influence on George Herbert Mead, helped develop the perspective in contemporary American social psychology known as symbolic interactionism. (cf. Cooley, 1902 and 1909) For those who prefer a literary account of this quality of “self-merging” I am identifying here, see the use that Robert Heinlein (1972) makes of the concept “grok” in his excellent science fiction novel, Stranger in a Strange Land.
more than pure rhetoric. Such organizations as the Society to Cut Up Men (SCUM) and the Women's International Terrorist Conspiracy From Hell (WITCH), with their somewhat bizarre and stridently anti-men campaigns, do little to inform the public of the basic structural conditions that perpetuate feminine inequality. (cf. Weinstein and Weinstein, 1974, Chapter 11) This type of rhetoric, however, is a minority in the movement and should be contrasted to the views of such groups as the National Organization of Women (NOW), led by Betty Friedan, the Women's Equality Action League (WEAL), and the New York Radical Feminists, all of which realize the necessity to liberate men as well as women and all of which acknowledge the necessity for basic wide-ranging structural changes. The basic point I am making, however, is the sheer fact that a love relationship can who says "I do not love Ford yet he looks at me with the same征集", would continue to delimit his freedom just as loving another person delimits one's freedom. Indeed, there is a sense in which any of us who deeply love are all in a type of prison — we are, consciously or not, subject to the control, confinement and routine of the other, qualities that hauntingly lend themselves to Erning Goffman's view of a "total institution". The mundane cliche about being a "prisoner of love" is on target — to love and to be loved is to "serve a sentence" that may end possibly only in death. But what are the alternatives to loving and being loved, to the sacrifice of one's freedom? Perhaps a refusal to love or to allow oneself to be loved? Hardly!

It will be recalled that the dialectical nature of meaning insists on the confrontation of anguish with joy, of despair with fulfillment, and the love relationship is where such a nurturing and confrontation is to be found and where the consciousness necessary for the acquisition of meaning is to be achieved. Those of us incapable of loving or of being loved are doomed to marginality and, consequently, to a total lack of meaning. In his novel, The First Circle, Alexander Solzhenitsyn (1974: 358), in referring to the prisoners in Mavrino, wrote: "Love, man's age-old source of pleasure and suffering, was powerless to touch them with its agony or its expectation". The prisoners in Mavrino had their "freedom" and, as Solzhenitsyn so powerfully indicates, would sacrifice it instantly for the "prison" outside.

As I alluded to earlier, the human condition abounds in man-created paradox. No other living creature has the dubious distinction of having the ability to create and meaningfully

\[ I \text{ call attention to the almost incredible ability that a loved one has to exercise control over the other.} \]

Thomas Hobbes once wrote that man's freedom ceases when he impinges on the (material) interests of another. Hobbes was wrong. Man's freedom ceases when he surrenders himself to a love relationship. Such a relationship, it might be noted, is not limited necessarily to another person, although my emphasis throughout has been on interpersonal relationships. Ideology, for example, is a powerful determinant of human emotion and the extent to which it lends itself to the "love framework" vis-a-vis meaning I have developed would make a fascinating topic in itself. The point I am suggesting here can be seen when the American who says "I do not love Ford yet he controls my freedom" is really expressing a love of country or principles upon which he believes his country is based. Love, in this "ideological sense", would continue to delimit his freedom just as loving another person delimits one's freedom. Indeed, there is a sense in which any of us who deeply love are all in a type of prison — we are, consciously or not, subject to the control, confinement and routine of the other, qualities that hauntingly lend themselves to Erning Goffman's view of a "total institution". The mundane cliche about being a "prisoner of love" is on target — to love and to be loved is to "serve a sentence" that may end possibly only in death. But what are the alternatives to loving and being loved, to the sacrifice of one's freedom? Perhaps a refusal to love or to allow oneself to be loved? Hardly!

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\[ ^{6}\text{There is an increasingly vast amount of literature that both empirically verifies the conditions of feminine inequality in the west and that powerfully presents the case for feminine equality. For examples of this type of literature see the following: Simone de Beauvoir (1952), Betty Friedan (1963), Caroline Bird (1970), and Kate Millett (1970). Newsletters published by various women's groups, such as "Off Our Backs" and "Spokeswoman", are also helpful data sources for the verification of female inequality.} \]

\[ ^{7}\text{If pushed, I would endorse the traditional conception of freedom as defined by the number of alternatives available from which to choose, as opposed to the existentialist conception which attributes freedom to the meaningfulness (or not) of the choices available. The comments that follow, however, are applicable to both conceptions of freedom.} \]

\[ ^{8}\text{It should be clear that my metaphor "prison outside" does not refer to Stalinist Russia, the setting of Solzhenitsyn's novel, but to the world of interpersonal love relationships that the prisoners in Mavrino left behind.} \]
exist within a continuous stream of contradiction and paradox. And so it is with freedom. Man's freedom is meaningless to him personally unless he can surrender it in relationships with others. Thus we have the age-old philosophical adage that freedom is meaningless without constraint. The love relationship vindicates this paradox and the relationship itself generates still another dilemma. As I have attempted to demonstrate, the dialectics of meaning assert the necessity for anguish as well as joy and the love relationship is the ultimate expression of constraint. The love relationship vindicates this "solution", if what one means by a "solution" is the elimination of pain and despair from the human condition. They are "eliminated" only in death and even here the theologian stands ready in the wings to counter with a "not always".

By way of concluding this essay I would remind the reader that not to love or not to be loved is to condemn oneself to isolation and a life devoid of meaning. At the same time, one needs to appreciate that a love relationship, like the essence of meaning itself, is a dialectical one. It is a relationship that realizes the fallacy of Helen Merrell Lynd's contention (1968: 226) that "love transcends power, anxiety and shame", and appreciates the reality that love indeed may create these very qualities. In essence, to love another or to be loved by another is to participate in this dialectic by experiencing the full range of human emotion and to eventually achieve the epitome of human existence: the acquisition of meaning... It is a painful acquisition but it is the only meaningful alternative we have.

By Glenn Goodwin

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POSEIDON OF ARTEMISSION

The sound of you is sea-sigh;
From the hollows of eye
Poured tides like tears.
How the earth shook
At your uprooting!
The ocean's shipwrecked lover,
Still, deep in your flesh
The sea-urchins flower:
Primitive periwinkles,
Voluptuous volutes,
The sea's anemones.

Breasts of breccia and pockets of kelp,
A sea snail centers you.
Your thighs are the ocean's thoughts,
The sea's dreams: ships and shells,
The olive and the moon.
Your toe is the centuries' toy,
Sensuous and sedimentary.

Waves have licked your legs
With tongues of foam.
The taste of you
Is salt and retsina.
The sea's mouths know the hollows
Where the conch cries,
Where the shell hides.
They tickle out the tides
Of blood and brine.
In your mind,
The ear shell is a siren.

POEM FOR AN EXHIBIT

This time it's a pomegranate
Round as a roan's belly
And twice as red
That makes the world feel right.
Pick it from the painting
And the young woman's breasts
Grow less ripe;
The wildflowers a washed vermillion.
Inside the cat's mouth
Is a secret
We no longer know
What colour is the cat's tongue.
When the cat's perch
Is a sink
Surrounded by pomegranates
This same cat
Yawns scarlet.

TIRAGE

I long for a little Vuillard:
The print dress loving the wallpaper
The yellow noon light
Prepares the table
For the oeufs mimosa, the citrons,
And a petit vin du pays –
Perhaps a Jurançon.
Here are humans loving their landscape,
Held and transfigured by the quotidien.
A thin man with a moustache
Makes the women smile
As they spread the cloth.
How do we know this?
Asks the cynic, the critic, the academician
Who only sees the women's backs.
Here and here, Vuillard responds:
The faint tenderness
About the corners of the room,
A little brush stroke like a laugh,
And this small gesture of drape
Which gently refuses to be hurried.

By Susan Oberg
“MUCKRAKING, PRIVACY, and the PUBLIC’S RIGHT to KNOW”
A conference on “Muckraking, Privacy, and the Public’s Right to Know” brought several award-winning journalists, politicians, and sociologists to the campus last fall. Marilyn Lester, a Pitzer alumna who has a Ph.D. from UCSB, and teaches sociology at Temple University, led the afternoon session by challenging the popular view that the news media objectively reports the news. She contended that newspapers create reality. Joining her on the panel were Eleanor Hoover, National Media Award winner; Laud Humphreys, professor of sociology at Pitzer and holder of the C. Wright Mills Award of the Society for the Study of Social Problems; Bob Simmons, Emmy award winning television writer; and Martin Weinberger, publisher of the Claremont Courier. The Courier has won numerous journalistic awards and last year was nominated for the Pulitzer Prize. Also on the panel was David Felton, associate editor of Rolling Stone magazine.

The evening session was devoted to the question, “Does the public’s infatuation with the private lives of public figures divert attention from issues of real consequence? Is the private life of a public figure tied to the performance of his public duties?”

Panelists were Governor Edmund G. Brown, Sr; Senator Dennis E. Carpenter; Frank Lalli, New West; Martin Kasindorf, Newsweek; Honorable Eric E. Younger; James Foy, KNBC-TV; and Philip Kerby, Los Angeles Times. Guests were introduced by Robert H. Atwell, president of Pitzer College.

The following article was excerpted from the evening session.

BROWN: At the very outset of this meeting tonight I just want to tell you that whatever I may say in these preliminary remarks, I have not cleared with my son, the Governor of the State of California, but, I might add that he hasn’t cleared anything with me either since he’s been Governor of this state. As a result, he’s the most popular governor, according to the polls in the history of the state.

In 1962, I had a little political campaign with a man by the name of Richard Nixon. You’ll all remember — not all of you, but most of you — as I look around this audience were probably too young, but at the end of the campaign he said, “This is my last press conference. You’ll never be able to kick Richard Nixon around again.” Now I thought this was the greatest accomplishment of my career. The point that I want to make is, after a tough political campaign he felt that the press had been very, very unfair to him. I might tell you that if I had lost I probably would have had the same press conference and said exactly the same thing.

Getting to the subject of this evening’s discussion, first, there is “muckraking.” “Muckraking” goes back to Lincoln Steffens. I would put it in the category of “the investigation of Spiro Agnew,” “Watergate,” the “investigation of Richard Nixon,” and the “Watergate scandals.”

Then we have the other side of the story. We have something that has become somewhat pre-eminent in the last two or three years and that is “scandal” and “sex.” Wilbur Mills’ falling into a pool or an ocean in Washington. Wayne Hayes, who put a gal on his payroll and she couldn’t type. Now this comes under the category of “scandal” and “sex.” I think both of those were legitimate objects of inquiry by the press.

Now we have another one. Donald Riegle is running for the United States Senate in the state of Michigan. He won the Democratic nomination over two very able and distinguished opponents. The Detroit News published a story about an affair that he had had with a woman volunteer in his office. I haven’t seen the story in the Detroit News, but there is no question of governmental intervention or anything that the girl did. She wasn’t on the payroll of the country, and she wasn’t a spy. I don’t know how many of you have read the story by Mike Royko
in the Los Angeles Times on Monday, October 25th. It's a very interesting article, because it points up the subject of our discussion tonight, "What is the responsibility of a public figure, what are his duties, what are the responsibilities of the press?" He then goes on to say that he thought the inquiry into Wayne Hayes and Wilbur Mills was legitimate, but in this particular situation he asked these questions: "Did it cost the taxpayer's money? Did it affect his performance as a Congressman?" There is no evidence of either effect. It is a very humorous article, but it is dead serious too. He then goes on... "Or there might be a few other possible reasons for printing such a story. If the woman had been a Russian spy, that would make it news, but she wasn't. Or, if Congress happened to be voting on whether to start World War III and he was in the lady's bed, but that didn't happen. Or even if the lady were the editor's wife that would be news, I suppose, at least to the editor. But this just seems to be a simple case of a male and a female editor. But this just seems to be a simple case of a male and a female who weren't married to each other going to bed. This has been going for centuries.

So you have the case of "muckraking," which is, to my mind, a legitimate inquiry, and then you have the question of gossip and scandal that you see in some of the lesser publications of the land. I think there are two or three questions that we should ask. Should there be any censorship? In my view, has any great right to know. Where is it written that the public has a right to know? The First Amendment says "people have a right to speak," and that's a different kind of right. As far as I know, there is no right to know. There is a right to speak.

I would take a little bit of issue with some of the criteria that the Governor talked about as "what is fair game." I think that everything is fair game. I think politicians and news people have, for too long, resided in the same barracks. I'm glad to see the rules change so that we can now talk generally about affairs that politicians may be having and whether or not they cost the taxpayers money. I'm not at all certain, incidentally, that affairs, even to some great extent, are going to be harmful to the politicians. I think if Representative Howe and others had not withdrawn under pressure of some concern about publicity they would probably be winning their campaigns next week. I'm all for telling everything there is.

KERBY: Well, I've never had any problem with the question at all. When I was a young reporter many years ago, I covered an apartment house fire and all the
good citizens in the apartment rolled out on the street. I was there with my pencil and pad, talking with the firemen and so forth, when a friend of mine, a businessman, rolled down on the street and the lady with him was not his wife. I knew both of them. He was very concerned about the mention of his name in the paper and I told him that it wasn’t relevant. I could pronounce the word then but I couldn’t spell it. But, I didn’t see that it had anything to do with the apartment house fire. I think that a politician’s private life is his own business until he makes it public. If Wilbur Mills dances in the pond with his girl friend, he has nobody to blame but himself.

Governor Brown suggested that newspapers should be held more accountable under libel laws and I agree. Some newspaper men disagree with me on that, but I think that a newspaper that publishes a story and hurts a person, is careless with the facts, should be subject to libel law. I don’t know what the problem is except that the country is generally more vicious, and people, I think, are generally freer with their language and comments about each other. This has found its way into some publications and it is difficult to tell whether the publications are affecting the country or the country is having an influence on the publications.

I would like to see certain publications disappear from the country, but, I don’t know how that can be managed under the First Amendment. I think probably we’re better off with the First Amendment than we are running some of these publications out of business.

CARPENTER: I don’t find those things particularly uplifting, but I am compelled to tell you, having announced to you the great bipartisan posture that I take as a former Democrat, now a Republican, there are many things to talk about in this area. I have been very supportive of our legislation in the state that requires people in public office to disclose the sources of funds from which they run their political campaigns. I have also been an outspoken opponent of that part of Proposition 9, and proposed statutes which require legislators or judges or anyone in a public office in the state of California to disclose all of their assets, all of their other income, gifts from their mother, and things of this type which I don’t think are a part of the public’s right to know. I don’t think you lose your rights to privacy when you become a member of a public office unless you have done something wrong.

About three and a half years ago I was reading some proposed regulations of the Internal Revenue Service of the United States government. One provision proposed that every bank in the United States, state and federal, would be required to report directly, with copies to the IRS, any transaction in a private bank account or a corporate bank account which exceeded $5,000. I thought, “I don’t understand how the government could get into our personal lives to the degree that it has the ability to demand this information from our personal banking records which are an extension of ourselves.” I found that there are literally dozens of state, federal and local agencies that have free access to all of our bank accounts and exercise it daily. I find that there are dozens and dozens of agencies at all levels that keep records on you and me. They have no use for them, but they maintain this information. Coupled with an in-
creasing fear of the computerization of record-keeping in our society, I came to the conclusion that this was a worthwhile project for a person in public life. As a result of that, one other liberal member and I have authored two pieces of legislation which are designed to meet the problems I just outlined. One is the Bank Privacy Act, which Allen Roberti, Assemblyman Roberti and I have carried for three years now. This year AB 3387 was supported overwhelmingly by the Los Angeles Times and by almost all of the major newspapers in the state. The bill had its only opposition from people for whom I also work very hard in Sacramento in law enforcement. This legislation was calculated to put the damper on and prohibit banks from giving information except as a result of a judicial subpoena. It protected the banks from any kind of liability to any government agency for refusing to deliver the information and, in fact, made it a misdemeanor with a $5,000 penalty and/or one year in jail for violation. The other bill that Senator Roberti and I co-authored was Senate Bill 1586. I carried the bill to identify the location of and put the lid on extraneous information in the hands of agencies that had no business having the information. Secondly, to require notification to people of the information contained in these public files. Thirdly, to give the public the right to get these files and to make demands for correction or to have some kind of a hearing if they felt that the information was inaccurate, unfair or misleading. That's the particular area of government interference into the rights of privacy that I have been active in and one about which I feel strongly.

KASINDORF: First of all, I believe there is a people's right to know contained in the First Amendment. Not in so many words, but it is there, and I think that every news person (I'm both a news person and a lawyer) considers the First Amendment sacred, and I think that it is the duty of all of us in the press to know what it says.

The First Amendment says, "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press." It is not just the right to speak. It is the right to read. There is a right to publish which predisposes the right to read. The right to read means "to get knowledge." If that's not a "right to know" then I don't know what is. How many people think Earl Butz had the right of privacy to not have John Dean publish his "black remark" in Rolling Stone? I would say that you are in a minority. Right?

Incidentally, there was a precursor of the Earl Butz situation. I would have published the Earl Butz situation, because here you have a Cabinet secretary in a year that, as in most political years, race is an issue. How the Agriculture Department, or other leading cabinet departments, handle the issue of race, handle promotions, handle other programs dealing with race is relevant to a political campaign. The kind of man who holds a high cabinet office is always a paramount consideration for a democracy, so I would have mentioned his name too.

But counter to this growing trend of freedom in this country is a growing menace to the press around the world, and a growing example, from country to country, of censorship and government seizure of the press. UNESCO now has before it a resolution by the Soviet Union which would sanction — give the UN's official sanction to worldwide government control of the press.

While we consider the limits of our freedom in this country, we must never go so far as to give encouragement to those of the Soviet Union and others who would impose their system on what we have now. Our system, by and large, despite all of its faults, works pretty well.

LALLI: I'm neither a lawyer nor an expert in this area. I'm just a practicing journalist and practicing all the time. I think you can be for privacy. I'm for privacy. I think that you can be for the public's right to know. I'm for that too. I think that you can be for "muckraking." I think there is a distinction that can be drawn for all three of those areas and you can be a responsible journalist and still be a "muckraking" journalist and still be someone who respects an individual's right to privacy. The
test, as well as I understand it, in
the courts for this kind of thing is
a question of truth and newswor-
thoness. Truth is not a defense
for an invasion of privacy.

Now, let's just talk about our
friend from Detroit for a second,
and the fact that he had a seven
year old affair that was brought up
during his campaign for re-
election. Should that story have
run? Was it an invasion of pri-
vacy? Let's look at the newswor-
thiness of it. I think that it is a
very marginal story. I'm not sure I
would have run such a story.
However, I'd rather have it run
than have that line of inquiry
closed to any reporter because that
affair could have led to any
amount of other revelations about
him.

Let me say one more thing.
Time and again I've seen politi-
cians hold up their wholesome
family life as an attribute and
something that the public should
act on, should vote favorably for.
In this case, the man has been
apparently caught in an indiscre-
tion. Is that any more valid or any
less valid than the wholesome
family life? I think they can see
through the fact that whether he
had an indiscretion seven years
ago has absolutely nothing to do
with whether you should vote for
him. I would lean toward the free-
dom of the press to make fools of
themselves in this area rather than
to close off the input.

YOUNGER: Thank you very
much, Frank. Ladies and Gentle-
men, your response to my request
for questions has been over-
whelming. We have about four
questions per person in the audi-
ence. Tom and I are going to do
our best to screen them
thoroughly, interestingly, and
perhaps even both. I'd like to start
off the questioning with one
which I just finished writing, by
turning it right back to Frank who
was our most recent speaker. I was
watching the Presidential debate,
and a question was asked of Pres-
ident Ford and Governor Carter
about the allegedly turned-off
public. The jumping off point was
the polls showing that roughly
50% of the electorate counts
would be turning out next Tues-
day. It is a little hard to under-
stand why the country with a
franchise as broad as ours polls
such a low proportionate that con-
template exercising it. Are they
rejecting public people generally
as bad folk? Has the media be-
come the message in a kind of
frightening way?

LALLI: Yes, probably. Sure, the
media are reporting these matters
and certainly they are having an
effect. There is no doubt about
that. But, look at the one that has
had the most impact on politicians
— Watergate. That's something
they did and we reported. Obvi-
ously, we couldn't avoid that.
That's a story that should have
been reported as fully as it was. I
would think very few people
wouldn't think the public had a
right to know the ramifications of
Watergate. You don't make it up.
You see it and you report it.

CARPENTER: I always like to
do this with a few press people
around because I see potentially a
double standard here. All press
people talk about the relevance
and the importance of Watergate
disclosures and so forth. I have no
argument with that because I
think it is true. But, at the same
time every person in the media, in
the state of California, screamed to
high heaven on behalf of four
newsmen in the city of Fresno
who had access, for a period of
time, either through a key or
through burglary, to the Grand
Jury and its records in the Hall of
Justice in that city. Anyway, they
copied and took excerpts from
these records on a regular basis.
This is all included, they say,
under the press' right to know
and to disclose it to the public.
These people have no obligation
to disclose their sources in a case
like this. So, presumably, if
a member of the press wants to
burglar your home, the same
thing for which the President was
thrown out of office ultimately,
through a series of related or indi-
rect events, he can do it with 'im-
punity. Maybe some of the press
people here could straighten up
my confusion.

BROWN: Remember that this
was a case involving alleged cor-
ruption of a public official that was going to trial within a period of three to four weeks. The newspaper got hold of this Grand Jury report that the judge had ordered held for the purpose of seeing that the defendant got a fair trial. The purpose of the secrecy order was not to have publicity so they would prejudice this individual who may be guilty or innocent. They violated the rights of this person charged with a crime. To violate an order of the court by the press or anyone else is terrible. Then for the press to defend it like they dropped a sacred bone seems inexcusable to me.

KASINDORF: There is a whole separate issue, and that is the First Amendment rights — right of the press to publish — right of the people to know versus the equally important right of the Sixth Amendment — the right of a fair trial. It's a whole different issue in many respects. I think very often the press, as Governor Brown implies, does have a meager self-defensive — all for one and one for all — reaction every time somebody from the press gets in trouble with a judge for alleged contempt of court.

There is a shield law for protection of sources, but, that too, the U. S. Supreme Court has said in another sense, must be balanced against the system's rights of somebody else's fair trial. Now, despite the shield law, Bill Farr, reporter for the Los Angeles Times, did spend some time in jail for contempt of court because there was a court order violated in the Charles Manson case and that prejudiced the rights of such defendants as Manson and Susan Atkins. No matter how lowly and obviously guilty in the public mind they are, they do have a right to have all the evidence come out in court and not in the Los Angeles Times.

YOUNGER: I want to briefly take up the matter of "gag orders" because it is very close to what Mr. Kasindorf and Governor Brown have just referred to. Are not gag rules becoming excessive and dangerous to the free flow of information, the freedom of reporters to protect their sources and, most important, are not gag rules a precursor of secret trials? There really are two kinds of gag orders. One is an order directed at the press — "Thou shalt not print something." The other is an order directed at court personnel, lawyers, witnesses, and so forth saying, "Thou shalt not talk about this matter." But the press can print whatever it gets. There has been recent Supreme Court decision-making in at least the former area and it probably has implications for the latter. I think gag orders are passing out of fashion. Moreover, the circumstances under which they can be legally applied are being reduced. I think they are going to become a less important feature of the legal and journalistic landscapes than they have been in the past.

We have another question. . . . "Can an editorial in a newspaper such as the Los Angeles Times be an honest example of "muckraking?" If so, why? Or, why not?"

KERBY: An editorial can be anything. It can be good. It can be bad. It can be an example of "muckraking." It could be a studious example of examining some important public matter.

I was interested in the case of this man, Earl Butz, whether or not the reporter had a right to report that remark. My assumption was that Mr. Butz thought he was talking privately to a couple of people and was not talking for publication. Now Martin says that Mr. Butz is a bad man. His Agriculture Department didn't hire Blacks and so forth. Therefore, when the story came out, it was okay because we got rid of the man. But, my suggestion was, where were the magazines and the newspapers doing a reporting job on the Agriculture Department to find out what was going on? That was the way to get at Earl Butz. When I was running a little magazine some years ago, people called me all the time, sent me letters, saying that they could prove Senator Joe McCarthy, one of my unfavorable politicians, was a homosexual and they could prove it. My reply was that that wasn't relevant. There was something wrong in this country if they couldn't get him square off. This is my feeling about a lot of gossip that appears in the press and so forth. This diverts publications from the pedestrian job that they ought to be doing, and that's recording what these men in public life are voting, what their stands are on unemployment. I don't give a damn who they are fiddling around with, except if they make that public, and that is an important issue.

But the press in the United States, regardless of the First Amendment, and regardless of shield laws, will survive or fall on the basis of its performance in whether it can convince the general public that it is doing a responsible and thorough job. The way you get men in public life is to go after them with the tools of your trade — report what they are
doing officially, what their positions are and so forth. We have to be especially careful in going after our political enemies fairly. This is crucial in this country. I don't agree with any kind of underhanded tactics by the press in order to achieve a good object or a good objective. I believe in the old idea that you go after your opponent honorably even if he is dishonorable. That's the way that this country should survive.

YOUNGER: Should a public figure know in advance whether his remarks are on the record or not? Is there a responsibility on the journalist to make that known? Should we put the gentleman on my right, who has faced questions on and off the record several million times, on the spot? Governor Brown!

BROWN: I think anytime you talk to a reporter, it is on the record. You may say, "I wish you'd put this off the record," but you must realize that he is a reporter. His duty is to appraise you and report you and record you. I don't think anything is ever off the record with a reporter. I think you're in the open domain. I think they have a right to say anything you say. I think it's fair game for them to report you.

LOWERY: I have another question for the panel. To what extent do political and business interests of the publishers, editors and station managers influence the editorial decisions to pursue either "muck" or scandal?

KERBY: The thing you have to watch in a country is where the power is, who has the power. The federal government in this country has monstrous power. The judiciary in this country has awesome power. The civil service in this country has awesome power. What the press needs to do is forget about these silly scandals about people's lives and start reporting about how the government functions, how the institutions in our country function, how the universities function. That's what the press ought to be doing.

Carpenter: Phil, you left out probably the greatest power of all. That's the power of a wealthy, large newspaper. Every morning it's just like going out to watch Moses come down from the hill—pick up your Los Angeles Times and see whether you have done right or wrong. That's important. Now that's a good influence but it's a terrible power and it carries with it a terrible responsibility. Politicians pant for a favorable word from the Los Angeles Times. They do a lot of things they don't believe in because of the influence of newspapers like yours for good, or bad, or what have you. Maybe they shouldn't be in office if they react that way, but that is a point. That is a fact. You have a tremendous power and responsibility. I think that the idea of a big, powerful, wealthy newspaper being influenced by advertisers is quite exaggerated. Look, if you want to talk about the power of a big newspaper, let's talk about the whole thing. What we have in this country is the power of the Pentagon, the power of great newspapers, the power of great corporations. We have, in this country, a ruling class. That's what we have. So when we want to start really taking a look at this thing, we examine the power of big newspapers. We examine the power of the Pentagon. We examine the power of the government, the corporations and all that. We really get down to it. Maybe we have a chance of adding some humanity to this country and straightening up the sins of all of us.

LOWERY: Okay. Just to wrap things up since we are running out of time, this will have to be our last question. This is addressed to Mr. Kerby, but it probably could be for the entire panel. Under the First Amendment, does the press have the right to be irresponsible?

KERBY: That question goes to the point that newspapers are irresponsible and bad and so forth, but the point is that some newspapers are good, some newspapers are great, some newspapers are lousy. Of course, everybody should exercise their freedoms and so forth responsibly. You know, if we put that rule on college presidents, on presidents of the United States and district attorneys, judges and everybody else, students and newspaper men, that they always had to exercise their freedoms responsibly, we'd have very little exercise in this country.
Jo Ann Schroeder was awarded $1,570 by the Ontario-Montclair School District to design and produce materials for teaching English to Spanish-speaking students in the regular classroom. The program is titled, "Here, See, and Speak English," for students 10 years of age and up. A graduate of the 1969 Pitzer class, she teaches fifth grade in the district.

Donald Brenneis, assistant professor of anthropology, has been appointed primary consultant for developing a series of symposia for the Los Angeles Community Design Center. The symposia, entitled, "California Redevelopment Policy: Does it Enhance or Diminish Community in the Los Angeles Region?" has been funded by the California council for the Humanities in Public Policy, and will involve policy-makers, academic humanists, and community people.

Peter M. Nardi, assistant professor of sociology, has been named editor of the Sociology of Education Section Newsletter, which is distributed to members of the Sociology of Education section. Nardi will participate in a panel discussion at the Fifth Annual Sociology of Education Association meeting in April.

William B. Schnapp is Director of the Legal Rights Resource Center, and executive director of the Houston Association for Retarded Citizens. He also serves as chairman of the Interagency Task Force on Services for Mentally Retarded Juvenile Offenders and is a member of the Board of Directors of the Mental Health Association of Houston and Harris Counties. He is a graduate of the 1972 Pitzer Class.

The Board of Trustees approved moving the Zetterberg house to the Pitzer campus at its meeting on December 7. The house, which was donated by Pilgrim Place, will be moved to the campus and restored for student activities. The following gifts have been received to offset costs involved in the move:

$5,000 John A. McCarthy Foundation
3,000 Avery Foundation

Additional pledges, in the amount of $45,000, have been received for the Zetterberg project, with the John A. McCarthy Foundation pledging $40,000 of this amount.

Eli Broad, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Pitzer College and of Kaufman and Broad, Inc., has pledged $10,000 in seed-money for the newly-formed Admissions and Outreach Committee of the college. The committee will evaluate methods for disseminating information about Pitzer in an effort to attract additional student applications and donor support. The Committee is chaired by Richard Riordan, a member of the Pitzer Board of Trustees and a Los Angeles attorney.


Trustees of the Elsie De Wolfe Foundation have awarded Pitzer College $2,500 to establish the Elsie De Wolfe Scholarship Fund. The funds will be awarded to a Pitzer art major during 1976-77.

Pitzer College recently received a contribution of $5,000 through the estate of Rhoda R. Samuels. Mrs. Samuels' daughter, Helen Juda, is a member of the Board of Trustees of the college.

The Mabel Wilson Richards Scholarship Fund has made a grant to Pitzer College in the amount of $7,332 for 1976-77. The Fund provides scholarship assistance to deserving young women in the Los Angeles area. Pitzer College has been the recipient of scholarship contributions from the Fund since 1964.
Norris Industries of Los Angeles has contributed $5,000 to Pitzer College for the Organizational Studies program. The program involves the study of organizations and provides students with an opportunity to study organizational change.

The near extinction of the "southern" grayling, a species of fish, is the subject of Clyde H. Eriksen's article in Cope. The article is entitled "Physiological Ecology and Management of the Rare 'Southern' Grayling, Thymallus Articus Tricolor", and grew out of his work as consultant for the U.S. Forest Service in addition to his independent research. He is an ecological specialist for the U.S. Forest Service.

Margie Shurgot has been appointed Assistant Director of Special Programs. She is particularly active in the recruitment of students for the New Resources Program.

Robert S. Albert, professor of psychology, will continue his research on precocious children through the auspices of Johns Hopkins University and in cooperation with Dr. Julian Stanley of that university. The longitudinal study of a group of precocious children and their families will be undertaken over the next ten years. He has contributed a chapter to the book honoring noted psychologist, Lewis Terman, entitled, "Observations and Suggestions Growing Out of the Study of Mathematically Precocious Talent." The book is Proceedings of the Terman Memoria Symposion on Intellectual Talent.

John R. Rodman, professor of political studies, was one of four humanists invited to participate in a conference on "Oil and Gas from Alaska: Choice for California," held recently at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles.

Initiated by the Center for California Public Affairs and co-sponsored by thirteen other organizations, including the Sierra Club and the California Council for Environmental and Economic Balance, the conference brought together spokesmen for the three competing oil companies involved, governmental agencies, and environmentalist groups to discuss gas transportation proposals and their potential economic and environmental impact for California.

Cynthia Tanner, a sophomore at Pitzer College is the winner of a Teagle Foundation Scholarship. Cynthia is the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. H. M. Tanner of Chester, New Jersey.

Pitzer College, newest of The Claremont Colleges, is a liberal arts college emphasizing the social and behavioral sciences. It has a student body of 730 and a faculty of 60.

Barry Sanders, Associate professor of English, will deliver a paper on "Beowulf, The Bear, and Faulkner's The Bear, at the Comparative Literature Circle's conference on Old Gods - New Heroes: The Power of Myth in Literature and Film.

A book on Thinking Animals by Paul Shepard, Avery Professor of Natural Philosophy and Human Ecology, is slated for publication in 1977 by Viking Press.

Beyond Virtue; or, Does Moral and Political Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" is the title of a paper to be presented by John R. Rodman, professor of political studies, at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association. The meeting will be held in Phoenix, April 1-3, 1977.

With Professor Thomas Lund of the University of Houston Law School, Rodman spoke to the Law and Humanities Section of the American Association of Law Schools at its annual meeting held last December in Houston.

Ruth H. Munroe, professor of psychology, and Robert L. Munroe, professor of anthropology, are publishing the following papers: "Coins and Countries" (with Jan Hitchcock), "A Sex Difference in Shape Preference" (with Leonard Lansky), and "Relation of Subsistence Economy to a Cognitive Task in Two East African Societies" (with Robert Daniels), in *Journal of Social Psychology; Sociobiology: Another View", and "Beyond Cultural Relativism", in *Reviews in Anthropology; and "Comment on D. T. Campbell's 'Conflicts Between Biological and Social Evolution' ", in *Zygon.

Richard J. Riordan, partner in the law firm of Riordan, Caps and Carbone of Los Angeles, has been elected to the Pitzer College Board of Trustees.

Riordan received his A.B. from Princeton University and his law degree from the University of Michigan Law School.

He serves as director of the Immuno-Science Corporation; American Thermoform Corporation; Acapulco Mexican Restaurants; California Golden Oak Products, Inc.; Lawbar Petroleum, Inc.; and Trans-Technology Corporation.

In addition to his work at Pitzer, Riordan is on the Board of Trustees of the John Tracy Clinic; the Greater Los Angeles United Way; Goodwill Industries of Southern California; and is chairman of the Board of Trustees of Mayfield School and The R. and R. Foundation.

Ernest Shell, chartered life underwriter (CLU) and vice-chairman of the Board of Golden State Mutual Life Insurance Company, has been elected to the Pitzer College Board of Trustees.

Shell received his A.B. from Miles Memorial College in Birmingham, Alabama and his M.B.A. from Wayne State University in Detroit, Michigan. He was the second black in the United States to receive his CLU from the American College of Life Underwriters and has been the recipient of a number of awards including the Oliver Crosthwait Award by the Chicago Insurance Association.

He is president of the Golden State Minority Foundation and is a member of the governing boards of Town Hall; Bicentennial Committee; Grantsmanship Center; Joint Center for Community Studies; the Foundation for the Junior Blind; California Job Creation Board; Board of Commissioners-Municipal Auditorium. He also is chairman of the University of Southern California Community Center Advisory Committee.